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WHAT'S IN A NAME? LAW'S IDENTITY UNDER THE
TORT OF APPROPRIATION
Jonathan Kahn*
"How lawyers talk about identity helps to constitute the identities of
themselves and others. If we talk more explicitly about how we all
negotiate identities and make choices amid the constraints of
relationships with others and patterns of power, we may make room
for discussion of what works for whom, and why."
-Martha Minow'
INTRODUCTION
Lawyers frequently address the issue of identity. Understandings of identity
inform myriad decisions, actions, and pronouncements wherever the law is found
at work. Such understandings, however, are often implicit, or are articulated in a
conclusive manner that presumes the identity at issue to be somehow natural,
fixed, or otherwise "given." In either case, the conception of identity deployed
by legal practitioners may mask or elide the complexities and nuances of identity
at work in real people's lives. Law's "identity" thus conceived is one of limited
potential and unrealized opportunities.
Heretofore, much discussion of law and identity has centered on issues of
so-called "identity politics."'2 For more than forty years, "identity politics" has
* Research Associate, Consortium on Law and Values in Health, Environment and the Life
Sciences, Joint Degree Program in Law, Health and the Life Sciences; Center Associate, Center for
Bioethics; Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97, 130 (1991).
2. The literature on identity politics is vast and varied. For some representative and influential
discussions by legal scholars, see AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE (Dan
Danielsen & Karen Engle eds., 1995) (hereinafter AFTER IDENTITY); CULTURAL PLURALISM,
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informed movements for social justice grounded in struggles to force recognition
and empowerment of previously stigmatized or excluded groups, such as
African-Americans, women, Native Americans, and gays and lesbians. 3 In
recent years, these movements have faced opposition from two quarters.
First, social-justice movements have encountered a backlash from the
political right against legal consideration of any identity-based characteristics.
This opposition is usually supported with such observations as "the law should
be color blind," or "there should be no 'special preferences' for homosexuals."
4
On the other hand, the political left has criticized social-justice movements for
validating classifications that both freeze identity and obscure the multiple
associations and relationships that make up an individual's identity.
5
Critics of identity as a legal category also assume that the concept of
"identity" is somehow judicially unmanageable. The right argues that judges
simply should not touch the issue for fear that judicial interference will somehow
pollute the purity of a supposedly objective process of adjudication. 6 The left
fears that judges will simply make a muddle of the matter, lacking the subtlety
and sophistication to appreciate the dynamics of identity-formation as a social
process. 7 Moderates posit the slippery-slope argument that expanding identity
recognition beyond the historically accepted category of race would open the
floodgates to recognizing identity groups without bounds.
8
These different positions share the basic legal assumption that identity plays
itself out as a legal construct primarily in the arena of equal protection. The very
notion that "likes should be treated alike" is grounded in a designation of
identity. 9 In contrast, I would like to engage in a program of identity-negotiation
that approaches a definition of identity from a different angle. To begin what
would almost certainly be a lengthy process of refocusing legal analysis, I
concentrate on the tort of appropriation of identity, an area of the law that
speaks explicitly, perhaps more so than any other area of law, to the issue of
IDENTITY POLITICS, AND THE LAW (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999); MARTHA MINOW,
NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW (1997).
3. For a general discussion about the history of social movements since World War II, see AFTER
IDENTITY, supra note 2, at xiv.
4. See id. (discussing types of opposition to identity-based characterization).
5. See id. (discussing reaction of political left to classification schemes).
6. See generally TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE FOR
COLORBLIND JUSTICE (1996) (discussing development of affirmative action and ways in which
individuals' views of race and identity affect present state of affirmative action); PAUL M. SNIDERMAN
& THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE (1993) (examining how Americans come to grips with issue
of race).
7. For a more comprehensive study of the dynamics of identity, race, and gender, see generally
SHANE PHELAN, IDENTITY POLITICS: LESBIAN FEMINISM AND THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY (1989);
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Angela Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
8. For a thoughtful discussion of this issue, see generally Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige,
Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855.
9. For a more philosophical discussion of identity, see generally WILLIAM CONNOLY,
IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX (1991).
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recognizing, constructing, and valuing something it calls "identity."
The tort of appropriation is grounded in the common law right of privacy.'0
The tort proscribes the use, without consent, of a person's name or image for
commercial gain.t" Commodification-that is, rendering a person fungible or
otherwise effacing, eliding or fragmenting identity-is a special concern in
assessing the tort.12 Such an appropriation and commodification of identity is
considered a blow to a person's dignity, undermining the integrity of his or her
self.
13
Being grounded in privacy law, the policy behind the tort does not focus on
the relational status of identity. 14 That is, it does not ask whether one person is
being treated differently from another on the basis of some characteristic of
identity. Rather, the tort addresses whether a person's identity is receiving
appropriate respect and consideration.1 5 An appropriation analysis articulates a
substantive, rather than comparative, standard for the management of identity.
16
The tort of appropriation originated from late-nineteenth-century legal
doctrine. At that time, genteel elites applied the tort in an attempt to protect the
upstanding bourgeois citizen and his family from perceived encroachments by
the crass national market economy and the burgeoning tide of new immigrants. 7
It has persisted throughout the century as a basis for asserting personal dignitary
interests implicated in protecting the integrity of one's identity.18 Many states
have enacted statutes that codify some form of the tort of appropriation, some of
which allow recovery under both common and statutory law. 19
For the purposes of this article, the tort of appropriation matters less as a
substantive protection for particular privacy interests and more as a vehicle by
which to explore and analyze how American courts have engaged directly with
the legal management of something they recognize as identity. In this context,
10. See Jonathan Kahn, Enslaving the Image: The Origins of the Tort of Appropriation of Identity
Reconsidered, 2 LEGAL THEORY 301, 302 (1996) (observing that American legal system has
recognized person's identity itself as something capable of being stolen).
11. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383,389 (1960).
12. See Kahn, supra note 10, at 320 (noting that commodification, which forces someone to enter
world against his/her will, is greatest affront to human dignity because it renders fungible distinct part
of individual's identity).
13. See id. at 302 n.5 (observing that tort of appropriation defines and recognizes identity itself as
personal right involving individual's interest in maintaining integrity of one's identity).
14. See id. at 303 (noting that privacy law does not require that like identities be treated alike).
15. Id.
16. See id. (noting that tort of appropriation does not fall under rubric of equal protection, but
rather is recognized as privacy principle).
17. See id. at 323 (commenting that appropriation of one's image for commercial purposes was
affront because it represented forcible expansion of way of life that influential people in American
legal community viewed with apprehension and disdain).
18. This emphasis on asserting personal dignitary interests distinguishes the right of privacy from
its cousin, the right of publicity, which typically involves the property interest of a celebrity in
controlling the commercial exploitation of her persona. See id. at 302 n.5 (observing that right of
publicity is property right and law deals with person's image as tangible thing or fungible commodity).
19. Id. at 323.
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courts have been talking about identity explicitly as a legal interest in a wide
array of cases for nearly one hundred years. 20 The courts' discussions are not
definitive, but they are illuminating. The discussions provide a useful and
potentially powerful starting point from which to begin a systematic assessment
of how the American legal system continues to recognize, construct, and value
identity.
The resulting analysis reveals that under the jurisprudence of appropriation,
identity, as defined under the law, has been articulated in a manner more open,
fluid, and sensitive to social context than critics of identity politics have found
under other legal regimes. The tort of appropriation provides a valuable
resource insofar as it reveals a well-established tradition of managing identity in
a non-essentialist manner. However, it must not be accepted uncritically as a
model for further legal action. The courts' engagement of identity as a social and
historical construct has not necessarily rendered the legal recognition of such
conceptions of identity more democratic.
In particular, as appropriation acts to police the boundaries between the
public and the private spheres, its application has often reflected and reinforced
existing social hierarchies based on gender.21 In practice, identity can never be a
wholly unmarked or neutral category. Put another way, the ways in which
identity is marked, elided, or taken for granted inevitably implicate existing
networks of power and social meaning.
22
Consequently, several of the cases examined below deal extensively with
the gendered dynamics of court decisions involving women's identity-based
claims. 23 These dynamics point out some dangers involved when law enters the
realm of identity. Nonetheless, the courts' opinions in these cases also have
value beyond their often disturbing and sometimes outrageous results.
24 Most
importantly, the opinions reveal a tradition of managing identity by elaborating
on models existing within the domain of established legal discourse in an effort
to address the legal recognition, construction, and valuation of identity. By
bringing that tradition to light, I intend to provide a new set of conceptual tools
with which to engage in the ongoing process of negotiating and contesting law's
definition of identity.
This Article is divided into three parts. In Part I, the Article discusses the
notion that under the tort of appropriation, a person's name is understood to
implicate critical aspects of her identity. 25 This notion is explored in relation to
20. See generally id. at 304-06 (discussing historical development of tort of appropriation).
21. For a discussion of privacy, democracy, and discrimination, see generally Jean L. Cohen,
Democracy, Difference, and the Right of Privacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING
THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL (Seyla Behabib ed., 1996); Anita Allen & Erin Mack, How
Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441 (1990).
22. For a sample of the extensive feminist literature on these issues, see generally JUDITH
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).
23. See infra Part L.A for a discussion of gender dynamics in court decisions.
24. See infra Part L.A for a discussion of analyses that may be rooted in gender.
25. See infra Part I for a discussion of the link between name and identity.
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specific historical cases raising the issues of whether a woman who adopts her
husband's name has a property right in that name and whether a person who
adopts a professional or stage name has separate rights in that name apart from
his legal name. Second, Part II focuses on a person's right to maintain the
integrity of his physical image.26 Finally, Part III examines ones interest in his or
her "aural image." 27 The paper concludes with the observation that the courts
are capable of accommodating society's flexible notions of identity, albeit in an
occasionally non-democratic fashion.
28
I. WHAT'S IN A NAME?
Claude Levi-Strauss has pointed out that "naming is a mode of
classification, and that classification is a necessary precondition to possession."
29
Commenting on Levi-Strauss, anthropologist Anthony Cohen further notes that
"his logic would lead us to the conclusion that naming is required for our society
to possess a person, that is, to make the person a member."30 In the law of
privacy, as elaborated through the tort of appropriation, we see the state
engaged in an ongoing process of defining and bounding the nature and status of
names, and hence identity, in society.31 This process implicates both individual
autonomy and the state's powers of inclusion and exclusion.
At first glance, appropriating a name appears to be a cut-and-dried issue. A
person has a name. Someone uses the name in an advertisement without
consent to help sell a product. Under these circumstances, case law reveals that
a tort has been committed.
32
Names, however, can be tricky things. They can be elusive, even variable
over time and place, as evidenced when a woman traditionally takes her
husband's surname in marriage. 33 What precisely constitutes a name has also
been a problematic distinction. Many people have nicknames, some more
distinctive than others. In the case of George "Spanky" McFarland, for example,
even the name of a fictional character may become so closely identified with the
actor portraying him that the name of the fictional character, in effect, becomes
another name for the actor.
34
Consequently, control over one's name may involve not only determining
26. See infra Part II for a discussion of an individual's interest in protecting her physical image.
27. See infra Part III for a discussion of "aural images."
28. See infra Conclusion for a comment on the malleability of identity.
29. ANTHONY COHEN, SELF CONSCIOUSNESS: AN ALTERNATIVE ANTHROPOLOGY OF IDENTITY
72(1994).
30. Id.
31. See infra Parts L.A and I.B.
32. See, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 920-21 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that right to exploit
value of fame belongs to individual associated with trait or character because right of publicity is
property right based on identity of character or defining trait that becomes associated with individual
when he or she gains fame or notoriety).
33. See infra Part L.A for a discussion of the appropriation of a woman's married name.
34. See McFarland, 14 F.3d at 920-21 (finding property right in identity of character associated
with individual).
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who uses it and how, but also control over the process of naming itself.
Furthermore, this notion of control includes the power to claim a name as one's
own or, alternatively, to disclaim a name. Each aspect of control implicates the
law in the construction of the self.
A. Appropriation of a Woman's Married Name
The 1931 case of Melvin v. Reid35 demonstrates that a person can have more
than one name and that different names may reflect or even evoke different
identities. Consider Melvin's situation: in 1925, the commercial film "The Red
Kimono" was released. 36 It depicted the true story of a prostitute who had been
tried and acquitted of murder in 1918.37 The film used the true maiden name of
the prostitute, Gabrielle Darley.38 The real Darley had since married and taken
her husband's name.39 At the time of the film's release, she was going by her
married name of Gabrielle Darley Melvin, having consciously shed her past
identity as Gabrielle Darley, the prostitute acquitted of murder.
40
Melvin sued for invasion of privacy.41 The court found in Melvin's favor
largely because it considered the use of her name as offensive to "right thinking
members of society."42 It was offensive because Darley had rehabilitated herself
and adopted a new name and identity: Gabrielle Darley Melvin. The name
"Gabrielle Darley" did not simply identify Melvin to her friends, it forced upon
her an identity associated with that name which she had tried to shed. The film's
use of the name Darley, then, constituted an oblique sort of appropriation: it
deprived Melvin of her current identity by compelling her to become once again
her former self, Gabrielle Darley.
43
There was also a gender-based hierarchy of naming at work in Melvin that
the court did not specifically discuss." The plaintiff's identity as Melvin derived
35. 297 P. 91 (Cal. 1931).
36. Melvin, 297 P. at 91.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Melvin, 297 P. at 91. Melvin did not specifically allege "appropriation of identity" per se, but
the gist of the action was that the film had used her true maiden name for a commercial purpose
without her consent. Id. at 93-94.
42. Id. at 93. Many commentators, adopting Prosser's four-fold classification of privacy torts,
have characterized Melvin's suit as involving public disclosure of private facts. See, e.g., G. EDWARD
WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 175 (1985) (classifying Melvin as example of unauthorized public
disclosure of private information). Certainly, public disclosure was involved in Melvin. But the heart
of Melvin's complaint and the basis of her sense of injury arose as well from the fact that the
information disclosed related specifically to her past identity. The confusion arises, perhaps, from the
tendency to conflate appropriation with publicity rights and focus on property-based injuries such as
unjust enrichment. White, for example, likens appropriation to copyright. Id. at 174.
43. Melvin, 297 P. at 93.
44. Anita Allen and Erin Mack note that Melvin won in part because the court was
paternalistically trying to protect highly gendered notions of "virtuous womanhood." Allen & Mack,
supra note 21, at 470. I agree with their interpretation so far as it goes, but they do not discuss the
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not only from her efforts at rehabilitation but also from her husband, whose
name she took. At issue, therefore, was the power to fix-and to affix-Melvin's
name.
45
"Darley" and "Melvin" each signified something different about the
subject: "Darley" signified her notorious life as a prostitute; "Melvin" signified
her rehabilitated status as Melvin's wife. "Right thinking members of society"
might thereby see that the film soiled the identity not only of a penitent woman,
but also of her husband and the institution of marriage through which she had
rehabilitated her identity.46 In the eyes of the court, her married name may have
carried more value than her maiden name because it was derived from and
subordinated to her husband.47 By resurrecting her maiden name, the film
threatened to invert this hierarchy by wresting control over her identity from her
husband.
The relationship between name and identity in Melvin's case is strong.
Anthony Giddens defines self-identity as "the self as reflexively understood by
the person in terms of his biography." 48 He goes on to observe that "a person's
name... is a primary element in his biography. '49 Biography is a narrative
concept and Giddens marks identity, in turn, as "the capacity to keep a particular
narrative going."'50 Appropriation of Melvin's name affronted her individual
self-identity insofar as it disrupted the coherence and integrity of her
biography-her ability to determine which identity she would claim and at what
time.
However, recalling Cohen's remark that naming is also a mark of social
possession, 51 we see that the movie also affronted society by undermining the
community's claim to name Melvin as a member in good standing. The "Red
Kimono," in effect, took Melvin, via her name, out of her community and into
the market. This type of naming did not confer social standing so much as it
established commodity value. It thereby threatened to subvert socialization by
supplanting local norms with market forces as the means for incorporating
individuals into the community. In granting Melvin's claim, therefore, the court
was not only vindicating her self-identity, but it was also reestablishing
community control over the terms of her social membership.
At an intermediate level, the movie also interfered with the husband's
ability to "possess" his wife by controlling her name. Thus, while Melvin
succeeded in her suit to control her name, her victory also vindicated and
reinforced the hierarchy of traditional marriage. The court here recognized
issue of naming as a social process.
45. Melvin, 297 P. at 93.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIETY IN THE LATE
MODERN AGE 53 (1991).
49. Id. at 55.
50. Id. at 54.
51. COHEN, supra note 29, at 72.
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identity as fluid, situated in time and space and constructed through varied social
practices.52 On the one hand, these social practices served to maintain a space
beyond the reach of commodifying market forces; on the other hand, they
reinforced hierarchies of the traditional "private sphere. '53
The variability of names and the gendered dynamics of some naming
processes are especially apparent in a pair of cases involving wives who sued
their husbands' mistresses for appropriating the wives' married names. Where
Melvin involved the power to assign two different names to the same woman,
these cases each involved two womens' claims to the same name.54 In an 1896
case, Anna Hodecker sued Emma Stricker for appropriating her name.55
Hodecker's complaint alleged that Stricker was then living with her husband,
Frederick Hodecker, "in relations immoral and meretricious," and holding
herself out to be his wife.56 Stricker, however, did not call herself "Anna"
Hodecker; rather she assumed the name "Mrs." Hodecker,57 presumably with
Frederick's consent.
Nonetheless, Anna Hodecker found the appropriation of the name and
status of Mrs. Hodecker to be deeply injurious. 58 As the New York Supreme
Court noted, Anna Hodecker argued that "the assumption by the defendant of
the name of Hodecker is an assault upon the identity and individuality of the
plaintiff .... -59 She sought damages of $10,000 and an injunction against Emma
Stricker's use of the name.60
This was a case of first impression. The court acknowledged that the claim
was not based on libel or slander but rather on the alleged appropriation of the
plaintiff's name. 61 However, it dismissed dignitary concerns, asserting that
Stricker's actions degraded no one but herself.62 Ultimately, the court held for
the defendant using a narrow, property-based analysis of the interests involved.63
The court found it "difficult" to see an invasion of any "proprietary right or
interest" of the plaintiff because Stricker did not "seek to personate"
52. See Melvin, 297 P. at 93 (noting that Melvin had transformed her identity eight years prior to
production of movie, thus completely changing her way of life and finding new role and place in
society).
53. See id. (discussing how major objective of society is to rehabilitate the "fallen" rather than
tear them down).
54. See Baumann v. Baumann, 165 N.E. 819, 820 (N.Y. 1929) (concerning two women's legal
battle for same name); Hodecker v. Stricker, 39 N.Y.S. 515, 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1896) (involving two
women's claims to same name).
55. Hodecker, 39 N.Y.S. at 515.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 516.
58. Id. at 515.
59. Id. at 517.
60. Hodecker, 39 N.Y.S. at 515.
61. Id. at 516.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 517-18.
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Hodecker.64 It focused instead on "[t]he possibility that others may be misled by
the assumed relation of the defendant to [Frederick] Hodecker" which, it
asserted, did not concern Anna Hodecker "unless by that means some of her
property rights or interests may be brought in question. '65 With no precedent to
draw upon, the court simply reduced Anna Hodecker's novel claims of injured
identity to the widely recognized property-based interest in reputation.
66
Warren and Brandeis' landmark article arguing for the validity of a free-
standing right to privacy 67 was only six years old at this time and its reasoning
had not yet been adopted by any court. The Hodecker court concluded that
"[t]he question of the identity of the plaintiff as the wife of Hodecker ... is
merely a social one." 68 Most telling, perhaps, was the court's suggestion to Anna
Hodecker that her best remedy lay in dissolving the marriage.
69
In declaring the question of identity to be "social," the court was trying to
maintain a boundary between the legal and social regulation of propriety. In
stark contrast to Warren and Brandeis, who articulated the right of privacy out
of a perceived need to use the law to manage the encroachments of modernity,
70
the court in Hodecker v. Stricker did not think it necessary to invoke the power
of the state to protect the interests of identity. Significantly, Stricker was not
seeking to commodify Hodecker's identity or otherwise subject it to market
forces. Nor was Hodecker the subject of an aggressive, scandal-mongering press.
The Hodecker court, perhaps, would therefore have seen little need to invoke
the countervailing power of the state to protect the individual from the ravages
of modern institutions.
Anna Hodecker was, however, subject to the whims and indiscretions of her
husband, and here the court had no desire to intrude.71 Indeed, the patriarchal
family was perhaps the archetypal institution of the bourgeois society which men
such as Warren and Brandeis sought to protect. In declaring that the name
"Mrs. Hodecker" did not necessarily refer to Anna Hodecker, the court denied
Anna any control over her identity as Frederick's wife. Rather, the court
implicitly granted control over the status and identity of "Mrs. Hodecker" to
Frederick.
Although the suit was against Emma Stricker, Anna's claim really
implicated Frederick's power to grant the name "Mrs. Hodecker" to whomever
64. Id. at 517.
65. Hodecker, 39 N.Y.S. at 517-18.
66. See id. at 516 (noting cause of action rests solely on fact that defendant wrongfully
appropriated Mrs. Hodecker's name).
67. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
68. See Hodecker, 39 N.Y.S. at 518 (noting matters in complaint presented moral questions not to
be handled by judiciary).
69. Id. at 516.
70. See Kahn, supra note 10, at 303 (discussing article by Warren and Brandeis). For further
commentary on the historical roots of privacy law, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
71. See Hodecker, 39 N.Y.S. at 518 (holding facts alleged in complaint did not support cause of
action).
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he chose. 72 The court refused to challenge the husband's power over his wife's
identity. Instead, it crassly proposed to Anna Hodecker that she get a divorce. 73
In other words, the court suggested that if Anna was offended by the
appropriation of this particular aspect of her identity, she should simply
surrender it so she would no longer be disturbed by the affiliation. 74 The court
effectively forced Anna to cede control to her husband of all aspects of her
identity which derived from the marital relationship.75 If the Hodecker court
manifested any concern for "privacy," it was as a means of reinforcing the
private domestic sphere as an arena of unchallenged patriarchal authority.
More than thirty years later, another court reached a similar result in the
New York case of Baumann v. Baumann.76 With facts similar to those in
Hodecker, Baumann involved a suit by Berenice Baumann against her husband,
Charles, and a woman who was living with him and holding herself out to be
"Mrs. Baumann." 77 A lower court granted a broad injunction that, inter alia,
prohibited the defendants from representing that they were married or that
Charles was divorced from Berenice.
78
The New York State Appellate Court found that such an action lacked
merit under the facts of the case and modified the lower court's judgment by
striking the injunction.79  The court reached its conclusion largely by
distinguishing between the name "Mrs. Charles Ludwig Baumann" and "Mrs.
Berenice L. Baumann." 80 It reasoned that there was no appropriation or
impersonation because the defendant had not used the latter name, "Mrs.
Berenice L. Baumann.
' '81
Unlike Hodecker, there was a strong dissent in Baumann that argued for
Berenice Baumann's right to control her identity:
Her married name is Mrs. Charles Ludwig Baumann; there is no other
such person living. She is known throughout New York in the circle in
which she lives by this name. It is more than a name; it is a position, a
status, a condition, a relationship, a capacity. A name may mean very
little, but the status and relationship which it indicates may mean a
great deal, not only to the parties, but to the world.82
The dissent concluded that the defendant had "usurped the status, the
relationship before the public, which belongs to the plaintiff. '83 In 1932, the
72. Id.
73. Id. at 516.
74. Id. at 518.
75. Id.
76. 165 N.E. 819 (N.Y. 1929).
77. Baumann, 165 N.E. at 820.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 822.
80. Id. at 821.
81. Id.
82. Baumann, 165 N.E. at 822 (Crane, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
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scholar Leon Green 4 seconded this dissenting opinion, asserting that the
majority "failed utterly to analyze either the interest involved or the hurt done
such interest," which he characterized as Baumann's stake in her "marital
personality.
'85
Baumann revolved around the problems presented by the recognition that
one person can have multiple names, and one name can be claimed by many
persons. The majority and the dissent in Baumann were essentially arguing over
who had the right to control the identity and status conferred by the name "Mrs.
Charles Ludwig Baumann. '86 The dissent took a more contextual approach to
the problem, focusing on the actual practices involved in using the name and the
effects they had upon the plaintiff.87 It legitimated the plaintiff's own claimed
relation to the name by situating Berenice Baumann within her social circle.
88
Social recognition confirmed her claim to her name and established that, as a
practical matter, the defendant's use of the name "Mrs. Charles Ludwig
Baumann" implicated Berenice's identity.
89
The majority took a more rigid approach, divorcing, if you will, the name
"Mrs. Charles Ludwig Baumann" from "Mrs. Berenice L. Baumann." 9 It made
Mr. Baumann the source or "author" of the name "Mrs. Charles Ludwig
Baumann." 91 As in Hodecker, the court denied the wife any claim to joint
authorship.92 The implication is that although the plaintiff may have controlled
the name Berenice Baumann, or, as in Hodecker, her maiden name, the fact that
she identified herself as "Mrs. Charles Ludwig Baumann" granted her no claim
to control the use of that name. Therefore, under the majority's decision,
Berenice indirectly became Charles' creation and possession to the extent that
she derived her status or identity from being "Mrs. Charles Ludwig Baumann."
Once again, the court subordinated names that invoke the status and identity of
"wife," and the women who claim those names, to their husbands.
The period between Hodecker, in 1896, and Baumann, in 1929, saw some
significant though problematic extensions of legal protections for women. From
the paternalistic, protective labor legislation affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Muller v. Oregon93 to the achievement of women's suffrage, the legal status of
women in the market and in political life improved markedly. 94 However,
84. See WHITE, supra note 42, at 76 (dubbing Leon Green "the most influential Realist tort
theoretician of the early twentieth century").
85. Leon Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237, 251 (1932).
86. Baumann, 165 N.E. at 819-22 (Crane, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 822.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 821.
91. Baumann, 165 N.E. at 821 (Crane, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 822.
93. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (affirming decision that state legislation
requiring woman employed in laundromat to work more than ten hours daily is unconstitutional).
94. See generally JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S.
WOMEN 192-230 (1991) (noting that legal status of women has changed dramatically during the past
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despite the well-intentioned dissent in Baumann, little seemed to change
regarding married women's legal power to control their identities independently
of their husbands.
This complex matter is not easily disposed of with a crude declaration that a
sexist legal system declared wives to be the property of their husbands. The
issue was not simply control over the physical body or property of the woman.
Rather, the law concerned the status of a married woman as an author of one of
her own names, implicating her power to control important parts of her identity.
The harm to Anna Hodecker and to Berenice Baumann was not physical or
monetary. In their cases, the courts amputated part of their identity and gave it
to their husbands to do with as they willed.
Two authors, Rosemary Coombe and Michael Madow, each engage
problems related to the legal attribution of authorship of names and images.
95
Their analyses focus on property-based rights of publicity but are nonetheless
illuminating in the context of privacy-based actions for appropriation of
identity-not least because the two interests are so often conflated or
confounded by the courts. Coombe and Madow criticize the courts'
understanding of the right of publicity for failing to recognize the ways in which
celebrity names and images are jointly authored. They argue against monopoly
control over the economic value of celebrity, in part because the celebrity's
identity is created by a wide variety of people ranging from professional
publicists to the audience itself.
96
In stark contrast to the courts in Hodecker and Baumann, Coombe and
Madow urge that no one person should be given control over an identity with
multiple authors.97 As applied to Hodecker and Baumann, Coombe and
Madow's approach might undermine the patriarchal authority of the husband
over his wife's name. Otherwise, however, their approach would afford little
relief to the likes of Anna Hodecker or Berenice Baumann, who still could not
reclaim their identities.
quarter-century and white women have received many individual equal rights which men have enjoyed
for almost two hundred years); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1498 (1983) (arguing that dichotomy between market and
family has limited effectiveness of social reforms aimed at improving lives of women in American
society).
95. Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics, and
Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365, 368-71 (1992) (discussing value of
celebrity image); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 134-38,
179-86 (1993) (discussing and dismissing traditional arguments in favor of right of publicity).
96. See Coombe, supra note 95, at 368-71 (questioning amount of value added to celebrity's name
by star's own efforts); Madow, supra note 95, at 136 (arguing against McCarthy's view that it is
"commonsensical" that celebrities should have exclusive control over commercial use of their
identities). Coombe and Madow's reasoning may be extended beyond celebrity because, of course, all
identities are multiply authored in the sense that they are the product of interaction with history and
society.
97. See Coombe, supra note 95, at 370 (commenting that star image "is authored by multitudes of
persons engaged in diverse activities"); Madow, supra note 95, at 184 (discussing argument that
market value is socially created phenomenon).
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The problem is that Coombe and Madow focus on the property-based
aspects of identity and overlook the fact that identity may also embody an
investment of non-fungible aspects of the self.98  To a certain degree, all
identities are multiply authored, but that does not mean that each author's claim
to control over identity is equal, particularly when it comes to the non-fungible
personal aspects of identity. In this realm, claims must be weighed according to
the degree to which an author's self is bound up with the name or image created.
Anna Hodecker and Berenice Baumann jointly authored their identity as wives
with their husbands. However, the appellation of "Mrs." applied specifically to
them. Because its use evoked their selves first and foremost, their privacy-based
claims of appropriation should carry greater weight than those of their husbands
or their husbands' mistresses.
A 1946 Oklahoma case provides an interesting twist on the issue of control
over the use of the appellation "Mrs." In Bartholomew v. Workman,99 George
Workman, Jr., a minor, together with his mother Pearl Ethyle Daglish, sued for
an injunction to keep Maybelle Bartholomew from listing her phone number in
the phone book under the name "Mrs. George Workman. ' ' t ° Such a listing
might have been perceived as referring to George, Jr.
The boy's father, George Workman, Sr., had died some time before and
Maybelle claimed to be his widow. 10 1 The trial court granted the injunction but
the decision was reversed on appeal.10 2 The appellate court found no cause of
action due to the absence of any showing of peculiar damages or invasion of any
privacy rights of the minor, George, Jr. 10 3 In the course of its opinion, the court
cited both Baumann and Hodecker with approval. 1° 4 Whether or not Maybelle
Bartholomew actually had been married to George, Sr. was not crucial to the
decision because the court concluded that "[tihere is no other woman having the
right to use the name of Mrs. George A. Workman."' 0 5
The Bartholomew court was looking for infringements on tangible, material
interests. 0 6 Applying an analysis based on the law of defamation, the court
found no cause of action because there was no allegation that the plaintiff was
"damaged in his character or reputation.' ' 107 The court ignored George, Jr.'s
privacy-based claim of mental anguish caused by the confusion of his name with
98. See Coombe, supra note 95, at 370 (implying that artists are not exclusive creators of their
images); Madow, supra note 95, at 191 (observing that, for example, "[Albert] Einstein was certainly a
participant of sorts" in creating his public image, "but he was not the sole and sovereign author of his
public image").
99. 169 P.2d 1012 (Okla. 1946).
100. Bartholomew, 169 P.2d at 1013.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1012.
104. Id. at 1013-14.
105. Bartholomew, 169 P.2d at 1014.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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that used by Maybelle in the phone book."°8
Implicit in George, Jr.'s complaint is the notion that after his father died he,
George, Jr., effectively became "George Workman." If that were so, then
Maybelle appropriated a name and status that he believed he should control.
Perhaps more than a bit of Oedipal ambition was at work in the child's attempt
to take his father's place. George, Jr., however, did not want his father's wife,
only his name; or rather, he wanted his own name to eclipse, subsume, or
perhaps break free of that of his dead father.
However, in this case the name was the means by which Maybelle was
designated as George, Sr.'s wife. Therefore, claiming the name directly
implicated the father's power to control that designation. Even from beyond the
grave, the father's power here remained paramount over his former wife or
minor child.
The court's treatment of the facts of the case indicate that there may have
been a moral evaluation of the parties implicit in the court's decision. In
reviewing the facts, the court noted that Pearl married George, Sr., on
September 9, 1932.109 George, Jr., was born only six months later, on March 21,
1933.110 They were divorced in 1936.111 Pearl then married Daglish and
subsequently divorced him.112 She was unmarried when she brought the suit
together with her son.
113
The careful attention paid to dates of birth and marital status of the
plaintiffs was not necessary to support the reasoning by which the court reached
its conclusions. Rather, it seems to serve no purpose other than to contextualize
the plaintiffs' lives for moral appraisal. The court may have dismissed the claims
of mental anguish simply because it did not believe these to be the type of
plaintiffs who deserved to have their sensibilities protected.
The focus on Pearl's shifting marital status implies that the court perceived
in her a moral laxity and disregard for the sanctity of marriage, an impression
reinforced by the unstated allusion to the fact that George, Jr., was conceived
outside the bounds of holy matrimony. Moreover, Pearl was a single woman
twice divorced at the time of the suit, unable even to bring the status of a second
husband to bear on her side. 114 In short, in the eyes of the court the plaintiffs
appear to have been a morally deficient woman and her almost-bastard child
trying to claim a patrimony they did not deserve. The court therefore denied
them the status of author of the name "Mrs. George A. Workman," effectively
letting it enter the public domain.
11 5
108. Id. at 1013.
109. Id.
110. Bartholomew, 169 P.2d at 1013.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Bartholomew, 169 P.2d at 1015.
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In contrast, the 1941 decision in Nebb v. Bell' 16 recognizes the possibility of
dual authorship where names coincide. In Nebb, a comic strip had main
characters named "Mr. and Mrs. Rudy Nebb." A real Mr. and Mrs. Rudy Nebb
sued under the New York privacy statute but lost when the court found no cause
of action, holding that the reference to the plaintiffs amounted to a mere
coincidence. Interpreting the privacy statute, the court found that:
the words "his name" ... appl[ies] to the use of a name coupled with
circumstances tending to refer to the plaintiff and not to a mere
similarity of names. Neither the use of another's name, which has
acquired an unique significance or secondary meaning in a certain
field, nor the trading upon the reputation of another, is involved
here.
117
In this very common sense interpretation of the statute, the court
articulated the difference between the form and substance of the name: the same
sign may signify different things in different contexts. The mere form of the
name "Mr. and Mrs. Rudy Nebb" was not sufficient to capture a part of the
identity of these particular Nebbs. The form of the name became invested with
the identity of a subject only through its operation within social context and
practice.
This is all well and good, but what of the "real" Mr. and Mrs. Rudy Nebb?
Did they suffer no harm at all? Was no part of their identity whatsoever
implicated by the use of their full name in the comic strip? Clearly they thought
so, and their sense of injury deserves to be taken seriously. The real Nebbs were
invested in their name as much as any other person. But any name may, in
effect, have both fungible and non-fungible attributes.
The court implicitly held that the comic strip's use of the name "Nebb"
implicated only the generic, fungible attributes of the name-the parts that were
not associated with any real person. To the extent that the comic strip did
implicate the real Nebbs' distinctive non-fungible identity, it apparently did so to
such a small degree as to constitute a negligible harm in the eyes of the court.
The degree of investment of the self in a name, therefore, was not wholly a
subjective matter. Rather, it was determined as well by reference to community
standards and understandings of the appropriate relation between self and name
in any given context.
B. Legal Name v. Professional or Stage Name
Where the cases of Hodecker, Baumann, and Workman involved the right
to claim a name, the case of Claire Davis, a psychic who practiced under the
professional name "Casandra," turned on the question of what constituted a
name before the law in the first place.11 8 Davis sued RKO Pictures in 1936 over
its use in a movie of a psychic character named "Countess Casandra."' ' 9 The
116. 41 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
117. Nebb, 41 F. Supp. at 930.
118. Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 16 F. Supp. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
119. Id. at 195.
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court had little difficulty in finding no cause of action under the New York Civil
Rights Statute, which codified the right to privacy, because it applied only to
"legal names" and not to stage or assumed names.12 0 In the course of its opinion,
the court defined a legal name as one which "consists of a given name or one
given by his parents and a surname or family name, the name descending to him
from them.' 121 The court concluded that "Casandra" was not the plaintiffs real
name because she merely took it on as part of the promotion of her trade.
122
The court's decision sounds reasonable enough. However, this aura of
reasonableness exists precisely because the court is using a history and tradition
of dominant social practices to bound the concept of what constitutes a name.
Under the court's reasoning, the concept of "name" does not reach to encompass
everything a person-or even a group-might want it to mean.
In Davis's case, we see the court enforcing the state's right to designate
certain naming practices as normative. Implicit in its reasoning is not only
Anthony Cohen's idea that a society possesses a person through naming, but also
the notion that society possesses the power to define the value and status of
naming practices. Davis was denied legal recognition of her power to name
herself because her practice departed from established social norms of naming.
She might be granted legal "possession" of the name Claire Davis but she had no
legal claim to own the name Casandra.
2 3
Significantly, the particular naming practices the court identified as
normative derive largely from non- or extra-market processes based largely in
traditional family life. True names were given by parents-last names, of course,
by fathers-not bought or sold.124 They were not market-alienable but rather
descended along familial lines as gifts given from father to child.125 Davis, in
contrast, took on the name Casandra for market purposes of promoting her
trade. 26 The court, therefore, did not consider her investment in her name to be
truly personal. 127 Hence, RKO's use of it did not harm her. 128 Moreover, in
naming herself, Davis may have been seen to be usurping the prerogative of the
male head-of-household.
2 9
120. Id. at 196.
121. Id. at 197.
122. Id.
123. Davis, 16 F. Supp. at 196.
124. Id. at 197.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 195.
127. Id. at 196-97.
128. Davis, 16 F. Supp. at 197.
129. William Prosser noted in 1960 that "[it seems clear that a stage or other fictitious name can
be so identified with the plaintiff that he is entitled to protection against its use." Prosser, supra note
11, at 404. Prosser used the example of "Mark Twain," the pen name of Samuel Clemens, as an
example of the type of name the appropriation of which he assumed would give rise to a cause of
action. Id. at 404 n.174. He did not, however, consider the nature of the relationship between
"Twain" and Clemens.
For example, in contrast to Claire Davis, a.k.a. Casandra, Clemens apparently did not take on
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We might also note that Davis was a single woman, engaged in a public and
rather theatrical trade, who was seeking legal recognition of her power to name
herself independent of established social naming practices. The court's decision
certainly may rest on a practical concern to prevent a slew of opportunistic law
suits by anyone who chooses to call herself by a name that was later used in some
public commercial forum. However, it is notable that Davis's claim involved a
peculiarly powerful assertion of autonomy by a woman at roughly the same time
that another New York court was denying Berenice Baumann control over her
married name.
In contrast, later case law moved beyond names given by families to
consider that names attached to individuals by society at large might also be
deserving of legal recognition, especially when those individuals are male.130 In a
manner seemingly at odds with America's liberal individualistic legal tradition,
the key seems to be that society retain a role in naming processes. 131 Such cases
further extend the boundaries of names and hence of individual identity as
functions of social and historical practices.
For example, in the 1970s, former football great Elroy Hirsch sued S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc., for the unauthorized use of his nickname "Crazylegs" on a
shaving gel.' 32 Hirsch had gained notoriety during the 1940s and 1950s as an
outstanding college and professional football player. 33 During his career as an
athlete Hirsch did a number of advertisements, in all of which he was identified
as "Crazylegs."' 34 The court took judicial notice of the fact that as recently as
five days before its decision, Hirsch had been referred to as "Crazylegs" in a
Madison, Wisconsin, newspaper. 135 Nonetheless, Hirsch was selective about the
commercial use of his name and, for example, refused to do advertisements for
cigarettes or alcohol. 136 Hirsch sued Johnson for damages.
137
the name Twain as a means to promote trade, but more as an identity-mask. Moreover, the pen-name
Twain was widely recognized and accepted throughout society as being identified with the individual
person whose given name was Samuel Clemens. Clemens may have originally authored the name
Twain but it was only through an established practice of social recognition that Twain could become
the equivalent of a legal name for him. Davis, we may note, was certainly known in some social circles
as Casandra, but the court implicitly denied the power of those circles to confer legitimacy upon
Davis's personally authored name.
130. See, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 918-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing male actor's
invasion of privacy claim arising from restaurant's use of movie character's name); Hirsch v. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (Wis. 1979) (concluding male athlete's cause of action for
nickname appropriation not precluded).
131. See, e.g., McFarland, 14 F.3d at 922 (stating "[t]he right to publicity protects the value a
performer's identity has because that identity has become entwined in the public mind with the name
of the person it identifies"); Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d at 134 (noting protection of publicity of one's name
supported by public policy considerations).
132. Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d at 130.
133. Id. at 131.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 131.
136. Id. 132.
137. Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d at 130. It is notable that no injunction was necessary because the
offending advertisements had been removed from circulation. Id. at 132.
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court found a cause of action based on a
somewhat confused conflation of the common law right of privacy as it related to
appropriation of identity and the property-based right of publicity. 138
Nevertheless, when discussing the nature of Hirsch's name the court was quite
clear:
The fact that the name, "Crazylegs," used by Johnson, was a nickname
rather than Hirsch's actual name does not preclude a cause of action.
All that is required is that the name clearly identify the wronged
person.
139
In contrast to Davis, the court recognized that a legal name is not only given
at birth or taken in marriage, but may also be attained or constructed in a
potentially wide variety of contexts.1 40 What mattered, legally, was the social
construction of the relation between the individual and what was asserted to be
his name.
141
One difference, perhaps, is that Hirsch's nickname was originally bestowed
upon him by fans, almost as a gift, through non-market social processes.142
Another difference, of course, is that Hirsch was a man. Granting him control
over his name validated the status of the autonomous, rugged American
individual: he was, after all, a football player. Social recognition may establish
the meaning or substance of the name, but control over that meaning is vested in
the gridiron warrior.
Although it was undisputed that "Crazylegs" referred to Hirsch, 143 the court
acknowledged that the nickname could additionally refer to other individuals. 144
Such an eventuality, the court argued, would not "vitiate the existence of a cause
of action" but, "if sufficient proof were adduced," it might "affect the quantum
138. See id. at 130 (noting intermingling of privacy right and publicity right).
139. Id. at 137.
140. Id.
141. In a strong dissent, Justice Day rejected the majority's more open conception of "name" and
its relation to an individual. Id. at 140 (Day, J., dissenting). He declared:
I would.., hold that two simple words like 'crazy' and 'legs' whether spelled separately or as
one word cannot as a matter of law under the facts here be regarded as the commercial
'trade name' property of Mr. Hirsch. The record shows that other athletes have been so
designated. If the name Elroy or Hirsch has been used with crazy and legs, a different case
would present itself because it would show that Elroy Hirsch was the person whose name
was being used for commercial purposes.
Id. at 141-42.
In an earlier case, also involving sports figures, a federal district court, applying a
straightforward property-based analysis of publicity rights, found in favor of a group of professional
baseball players who sought to enjoin a baseball table game manufacturer from using the players'
names and statistical information (batting averages, etc.) without their consent. Uhlaender v.
Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970). In the course of its opinion the court held that a
celebrity's "identity"' may be embodied in "statistics and other personal characteristics" that were
"the fruit of his labors." Id.
142. Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d at 131.
143. Id. at 132.
144. Id. at 137.
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of damages should the jury impose liability or it might preclude liability
altogether.' 45 Now more closely in line with the reasoning of the opinion in
Davis and Nebb, the Hirsch court implied that one's investment in a name might
be diluted by other claims to the same name.146 Consequently, although Hirsch
may have been deeply invested in his nickname, to the extent that there were
other well-known entities-such as S.C. Johnson-similarly invested in the title
"Crazylegs," its usage became more coincidental and did not directly implicate
Hirsch's identity. 147 The ultimate determination of damages apparently would
turn upon the nature and degree of Hirsch's identification with his nickname.
148
In this context, I use the term "identification" in a dual sense. First, the
term refers to the degree to which an individual is identified by others with a
name, an important measure both of the commercial value of the name and of
the social distinctiveness of the individual's relation to it. Second, the term refers
to the degree to which the individual has invested his identity in the name, an
important measure of its personal value. For this court, therefore, one's name
apparently derived its legal significance from its relation to the individual as a
socially distinguished marker and/or as an actual embodiment of aspects of his
identity.
The opinion in the 1994 case of McFarland v. Miller149 elaborates further on
how courts have confronted the problems of granting legal recognition to
identity as manifested in a name. It moves one step beyond the problem of
nicknames to address the legal status of fictional names which somehow become
attached to real people. George McFarland, the plaintiff, starred as a child actor
in a series shown in movie theaters from the 1920s to the 1940s under the title of
"Our Gang," and which later aired on television under the name of the "Little
Rascals."' 50  The characters from those productions have since entered the
pantheon of popular culture icons. McFarland played a character named
"Spanky,"'151 perhaps the best known of all. Over the years, McFarland steadily
145. Id.
146. Id. The appropriate analogy here, perhaps, is to the requirement in public nuisance torts
that the plaintiff sustain a distinctive injury that marks him out from other affected individuals. See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (Tentative Draft No. 17, 1971) (noting that
sixteenth-century English law "first held that a private individual who had suffered particular damage
differing from that sustained by the public at large might have a tort action to recover damages for the
invasion of the public right"). Like someone breathing smog, the Nebbs felt oppressed by the comic
strip, but the strip did not single them out or differentiate them from any other "Mr. and Mrs. Rudy
Nebb" who might exist. Nebb v. Bell Syndicate, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 929, 929-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
The analogy seems especially apt if one considers what would happen to a comic strip with a
character named "John Smith." As William Prosser noted, "lilt is the plaintiff's name as a symbol of
his identity that is involved here, and not his name as a mere name. There is, as a good many thousand
John Smiths can bear witness, no such thing as an exclusive right to the use of any name." Prosser,
supra note 11, at 403.
147. Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d at 137.
148. Id.
149. 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994).
150. McFarland, 14 F.3d at 914.
151. Id.
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received income from licensing the name Spanky for commercial purposes.
52
In 1990, McFarland sued a restaurant for the commercial use, without his
consent, of the name Spanky together with an image of McFarland as he
appeared in his "Our Gang" days.153 McFarland sought both damages and
injunctive relief on claims based on the right of publicity, common law invasion
of privacy, unjust enrichment, the Lanham Act, and the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act. 154 The case provides a clear example of how privacy and property
claims may become entwined in a single action for appropriation of identity.
By the time the case reached the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
McFarland had died and his estate was maintaining the suit.1 55 For this reason,
the decision focused largely on the inheritable property-based rights of publicity
involved in the claim. 156 Nonetheless, the court declared that McFarland's
personal invasion of privacy claim survived because he invoked it during his
lifetime.
157
The opinion dealt extensively with how the self becomes implicated in a
name in ways that go beyond mere investment of material value.158 It also
complicated the meaning of "name" because, of course, Spanky was not
McFarland's "real" name, yet he laid claim to it as his own.159 For our purposes,
the most interesting issue in the case is the court's treatment of whether the
name of the fictional character Spanky invoked McFarland's identity to a degree
sufficient to support a cause of action for appropriation.
160
The "Little Rascals" and "Our Gang" series depicted a group of children in
contemporary realistic settings playing the same characters over a number of
years in many films. 161 Given the nature of the presentation, the court found
that it was not unreasonable to consider Spanky the character and McFarland
the actor as almost one and the same. 162 In a telling footnote, the court
distinguished McFarland's situation from that of other actors who also became
well-known for portraying particular characters:
We think the case in which an actor becomes known for a single role
such as Batman is different .... [Adam] West's association with the role
of Batman or Johnny Weismuller's with the role of Tarzan is different
than McFarland's identification with Spanky. West's identity did not
merge into Batman and Weismuller did not become indistinguishable
from Tarzan. McFarland, like Groucho Marx, may have become
152. Id. at 915.
153. Id. at 914.
154. Id. at 916.
155. McFarland, 14 F.3d at 914-15, 917.
156. Id. at 917.
157. Id. at 918.
158. See id. at 920 (noting screen persona may become inseparable from actor's own public
image).
159. Id. at 920-22.
160. McFarland, 14 F.3d at 921-22.
161. Id. at 914.
162. Id. at 921.
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indistinguishable in the public's eye from his stage persona of
Spanky.
163
The court's reference to an actor's identity "merging" with a character is
powerful and revealing. The name Spanky implicated two separate personae,
one fictional and the other real. The main question for the court was whether
McFarland had become "so inextricably identified with Spanky McFarland that
McFarland's own identity would be invoked by the name Spanky."'164 The
"merging" discussed by the court was not only between McFarland and the name
"Spanky," but also between McFarland and the fictional persona represented by
the name. The court extended the boundary of the self beyond McFarland's
given name to a separate referent, Spanky, which itself served as a source of
meaning and identity.
McFarland cared about how the identity of Spanky was used precisely
because it implicated a part of his own self. The court framed this problem as
follows:
Where an actor's screen persona becomes so associated with him that it
becomes inseparable from the actor's own public image, the actor
obtains an interest in the image which gives him standing to prevent
mere interlopers from using it without authority.
165
McFarland did not consider himself to be Spanky, yet neither could he
separate himself from the Little Rascal. Spanky was like his celluloid conjoined
twin, constituting a separate identity but always, inextricably, a part of himself.
The court's reasoning also reflects a certain ambiguity about the source and
nature of the identity implicated by the character Spanky. On one hand, the
court appeals to the public's objective perception to determine the degree to
which McFarland was bound up with the name Spanky.t66 On the other hand, in
the court's consideration of how "McFarland's own identity would be invoked by
the name Spanky," 167 there is an unmistakable concern for McFarland's
subjective experience of the appropriation. 168  The very term "invoked"
connotes the idea of calling McFarland's identity involuntarily into the service of
the defendant.
The court resolved significant aspects of the case by a relatively
straightforward appeal to publicity rights:
The right to publicity protects the value a performer's identity has
because that identity has become entwined in the public mind with the
name of the person it identifies. It is this value that Miller sought to
use without authority or right. McFarland, not Miller, crafted the
163. Id. at 920-21 n.15.
164. Id. at 921 (emphasis added).
165. McFarland, 14 F.3d at 920.
166. See, e.g., id. at 914 (reasoning that "the name Spanky McFarland has become so identified
with McFarland... as to be indistinguishable from him in public perception").
167. Id. at 921.
168. See, e.g., id. at 922 (implying that because McFarland was "known through most of his life as
George 'Spanky' McFarland," he should be able to demonstrate personal identification with the name
Spanky).
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irrepressible persona of "Our Gang's" Spanky.169
The reference to "crafting" a persona again calls to mind the work of
Rosemary Coombe and Michael Madow, who critique the idea that a celebrity's
identity is not authored by a single person and hence not subject to anyone's sole
control. 170 The court here granted McFarland and his heirs monopoly control
over the property rights in the name and image of Spanky.17 1 Yet, paradoxically,
McFarland did not craft the relationship between himself and Spanky which
served as the basis for his suit.172 The court repeatedly noted that the "public"
had conflated Spanky with McFarland to such an extent that the two had become
inextricably entwined.1 73  Social perception altered McFarland's identity by
melding it with Spanky, thereby creating "George 'Spanky' McFarland."
There is a sense here that McFarland had a new identity foisted upon him
by society. Recall that Melvin also had an identity foisted upon her, but it was
one of her own experience. 174 Melvin objected to the fact that a specific
individual or corporation had resurrected her past identity for commercial
gain.175 McFarland, however, did not object to the creation or restoration of the
identity, but merely to its subsequent use by a restaurateur. 176 He accepted,
indeed he capitalized upon, the identity which society had authored for him.
177
If McFarland did not himself author the relationship which altered his
identity, by what right could he claim to enjoin its use by others? He could not
base his claim exclusively on the property-rights notion of having "crafted" the
identity by himself. Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that it was still his identity
which was being invoked by the name Spanky and no one else's. Although not
the sole author of the new identity, McFarland alone was "inextricably
identified" with it. That is, the name Spanky not only contained the commercial
value of a celebrity product, but also was invested with non-fungible aspects of
169. Id. at 922.
170. See Coombe, supra note 95, at 369-71 (noting that value of celebrity image or identity is
result of factors such as public response, fan clubs, and careful cultivating by studios and other
representatives); Madow, supra note 95, at 140-41 (arguing that consumer appropriates celebrity
image and invests it with new meaning).
171. See McFarland, 14 F.3d at 921 (stating "there is evidence of identification between the name
Spanky and the actor McFarland sufficient to show that he, and now his estate, have a right of
publicity").
172. See id. at 922 (stating relationship between McFarland and name "Spanky McFarland" was
result of public's perception and association of McFarland as Spanky).
173. See id. (noting performer's identity "become[s] entwined in the public mind with the name
of the person it identifies").
174. See Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 92 (Cal. 1931) (observing that use of incidents from Melvin's
life in movie is not actionable wrong for invasion of privacy because incidents used were matter of
public record and thus could not be private).
175. Id. at 91.
176. See McFarland, 14 F.3d at 914 (arguing unauthorized commercial use of name "Spanky
McFarland" constituted misappropriation of McFarland's proprietary interest in that name).
177. See id. at 914-15 (stating McFarland played TV character "Spanky" as actor, but in real life
McFarland also adopted name and capitalized upon benefits and fame "Spanky" had to offer).
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McFarland's personal identity.
178
II. MIRROR, MIRROR: APPROPRIATION OF PHYSICAL IMAGE
Like names, images of the self are many and varied in the law of
appropriation It is no coincidence that the tort of appropriation emerged with
the development of mass commercial photography, and the use of a
photographic image is most commonly associated with the tort. 179 However,
courts over the years have found myriad representations to embody aspects of
the self sufficient to justify a claim for their appropriation.
180
178. David Lange criticizes courts for granting privacy or publicity-based protection to claims
involving fictional characters citing, inter alia, the case of Bela Lugosi, who sued over the
appropriation of his distinctive persona as Dracula. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 172 U.S.P.Q. 541
(Cal. Super. 1972), rev'd 70 Cal. App. 3d 552 (1977), affd 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979). In Lugosi, the
court held that the right to exploit name and likeness is personal to the artist and must be exercised, if
at all, by him during his lifetime. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431.
Lange also cites Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). In Groucho, the lower court held that under New
York law the right of publicity was fully descendible and alienable, and that the Marx Brothers
retained a fully protected proprietary right over the unique appearance, style, and mannerisms of the
Marx Brothers. Groucho, 523 F. Supp. at 491-92. This opinion was reversed not because of the ruling,
but due to the decision that California law governed, which did not recognize a descendible right of
publicity. Groucho, 689 F.2d at 318, 320-21.
Lange expresses concern that recognizing individual claims to fictional characters may stifle
further artistic or commercial innovation. All characters involve a measure of creative invention.
What we and the courts cannot know, he argues, "is how much of these characters the Marx Brothers
themselves appropriated from others." David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 161 (1981).
Lange's concerns, however, seem ultimately to stem from the courts' failure to appreciate the
degree of independent creative invention used by the defendants in remaking the images to suit their
own purposes. Certainly, not only fictional characters appropriate aspects of their identities from
other characters. We are all multiply authored to the extent that we are influenced by, and take on,
certain characteristics of the various people we encounter throughout our lives. What matters is not
appropriation of characteristics, but appropriation of identity. The fact that I shrug my shoulders like
my father or have picked up distinctive turns of phrase from my wife does not mean that I have
appropriated their identities. Rather, I have adopted certain of their characteristics and made them
my own.
Arguably, this is what the Marx Brothers did with certain other Vaudeville acts. The lower
court in Groucho simply found that the play amounted only to an imitative work lacking in "significant
value as pure entertainment." Id. at 160 (quoting Groucho, 523 F. Supp at 492-94). While I tend to
agree with Lange's criticism of the court's conclusion in this regard, this particular result does not
necessarily undermine the privacy-based principle that to the extent that a particular usage
distinctively and primarily evokes an individual's identity, that person has a valid claim of
appropriation. Had the defendants in Groucho sufficiently marked their use of the Marx Brothers'
characters with their own distinctive and separate identity, the court may well have found in their
favor regardless of whether the right of publicity was inheritable. In such a case, one might argue, the
contemporary actors would not only appropriate the form of the Marx Brothers characters, but also
imbue them with a new and different substance or identity.
179. See Kahn, supra note 10, at 308 (stating that development of photography opened door to
invasions upon right to be let alone, thereby creating need for state regulation and protection of
privacy).
180. See infra Parts II.A, II.B and III.
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These representations include other obvious forms of visual representation
such as drawings 81 or sculpture. 182 Additionally, they include the less-obvious
example of a fabricated photo-montage which contained only the head of one
person placed on another person's body. 8 3  Pushing the concept of
representation even further, courts have found that the use of celebrity look-
alikes may constitute appropriation.' 84 One case even found appropriation in
the use of a look-alike android.
1 85
Impersonations may be covered as well. 8 6 As we saw in the case of George
McFarland, fictional characters may also provide the basis for a claim of
appropriation. 187 Aural representations have likewise been included as "images"
for the purposes of appropriation law where the distinctive vocal style of a
celebrity was at issue.188 Thus, the use of "sound-alikes" may give rise to a claim
of appropriation.189 Finally, beyond a direct representation of a personal
attribute of the subject, courts have found that the use of objects or slogans
which are strongly identified with the subject may amount to an appropriation of
identity.19°
181. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that drawing
of black man seated in corner of boxing ring accompanied by words "the Greatest" was sufficient
likeness of Mohammed Ali to provide cause of action for violation of right of publicity).
182. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods.,
Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 698, 706 (Ga. 1982) (holding marketing of plastic bust of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., was misappropriation of his likeness which violated right of publicity).
183. See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 877-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant on basis that use of photograph of Cary Grant's head on torso of model in
magazine article would be violation of Grant's right of publicity if likeness was used for trade).
184. See, e.g., Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 622-23, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding
use of photographs of Woody Allen look-alike in advertisements constituted "portrait or picture" of
Allen in violation of Lanham Act's prohibition against unfair competition); Onassis v. Christian Dior-
New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 258-60 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding use of photograph in
advertisement of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis look-alike constituted misappropriation of Onassis's
"portrait or picture" in violation of right of privacy).
185. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396-99 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
advertisement's use of robot dressed in wig, gown, and jewelry, consciously selected to resemble
Vanna White, which posed next to game board easily recognizable as Wheel of Fortune, was
misappropriation of White's identity in violation of right to publicity).
186. See, e.g., Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1348-49, 1354 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding
defendant's Elvis impersonation was misappropriation of Presley's likeness as protected by right of
publicity).
187. See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F3d. 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that naming restaurant
"Spanky's," which referenced name of TV character played by George McFarland, was
misappropriation of McFarland's image as Spanky McFarland).
188. See infra Part III for a discussion of aural-image appropriation.
189. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098-1100 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding singer,
whose unique voice was imitated in radio commercial, had cause of action for misappropriation under
right of publicity); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding use of Bette
Midler "sound-alike" in advertisements constituted misappropriation of Midler's identity).
190. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983)
(holding catch phrase "Here's Johnny," which was coined by Johnny Carson, host of Tonight Show,
was sufficient characteristic of Carson's identity, thus naming a corporation "Here's Johnny Portable
Toilets" was misappropriation of his identity); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498
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A. Physical Representations of Identity
The first requirement for finding an appropriation of identity is that the
image in question be recognizable as the subject, or as embodying an aspect of
the subject's identity. 191 This is not necessarily the same thing as requiring that in
the case of a photograph, to state one example, the image actually be of the
subject. For example, in the case of Howell v. New York Post,192 the plaintiff
sued over the publication in a newspaper of a photograph showing her on the
grounds of a private psychiatric hospital in the company of a celebrity. The
plaintiff ultimately lost the case because she failed to meet the burden of
showing that the photograph did not serve a newsworthy purpose.
193
Before reaching this conclusion, however, the court first considered the
threshold question of whether the plaintiff's face was discernible. 194 The
photographic representation of a person who, in fact, happened to be the
plaintiff was not enough. 195 To constitute an actionable appropriation of the
plaintiff's image, the representation had to be recognizable as distinctly and
uniquely belonging to the plaintiff: it must be "identified" with the plaintiff in
the sense of embodying aspects of the plaintiffs "identity."'' 96 Such identification
must be made by objective viewers, independent of the subject's own awareness
that the picture is, in fact, of her.
197
In contrast, when Mohammed Ali sued Playgirl magazine for publishing a
nude portrait of him, which the court had characterized as "an illustration falling
somewhere between representational art and cartoon," the court first established
that the drawing did, in fact, portray Ali. 198 It did this by referring not only to
the physical likeness but also to the caption "The Greatest," a moniker
commonly established in the public mind as a nickname for Ali. 199 Together,
nickname and likeness constituted an "image" of Ali.2
°°
The mere incidental use of an image, however, does not necessarily
F.2d 821, 822, 827 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding use of professional race-car driver's car in advertisements
constituted cause of action for misappropriation).
191. In considering the issue of whether there has been an appropriation of the plaintiffs
identity, Prosser notes that "there is no liability for the publication of a picture of his hand, leg and
foot, his dwelling, his automobile, or his dog, with nothing to indicate whose they are." Prosser, supra
note 11, at 404-05. Although the comment is accurate so far as it goes, Prosser again fails to consider
just why this is so. The question is not simply one of objective identification of an attribute by society
at large, but also the concomitant subjective investment of one's identity in the image portrayed. The
more interesting issue to explore is how social recognition seems to actualize the subject's investment
of her identity in any particular image thereby giving rise to a claim of appropriation.
192. 612 N.E.2d 699 (N.Y. 1993).
193. Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 703-04.
194. Id. at 700.
195. Id. at 704.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 700.
198. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
199. Id. at 727.
200. Id.
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constitute appropriation. In 1979, Sue Crump, a coal miner, sued Beckley
Newspapers for, inter alia, appropriation of identity based on its publication of
her picture accompanying a news article on harassment of women miners.201 For
an earlier article on women coal miners, the defendant had taken some
photographs of Crump and, with her knowledge and consent, had published one,
together with her name, in 1977.202 Then, in 1979, in a separate article on
harassment of women miners, the defendant had reprinted a different
photograph of Crump without her name.203 Crump never authorized this second
use of her picture, although it was taken at the same time as the previously
authorized one.
2°4
The court found sufficient issues of fact to merit bringing the case to trial.
20 5
In the course of its opinion, the court made the rather striking observation that:
[i]n the present case, Crump's photograph was not published because it
was her likeness, it was published because it was the likeness of a
woman coal miner. It was merely a file photograph used as a matter of
convenience to illustrate an article on women coal miners. This type of
incidental use is not enough to make the publication of a person's
photograph an appropriation.
2°6
Like a name such as "Nebb," an image can also have multiple identities,
20 7
but then, so can a person.
Commenting on the need to reconcile the shifting and evolving nature of an
individual's selfhood with the demand for a "stable, core self," Anthony Cohen
suggests that "the answer.., sees the individual as a basket of selves which come
to the surface at different social moments as appropriate. The basket, the
container of these selves, is the individual's identity." 2°8 Using Cohen's notion of
identity as containing multiple selves, we may consider that appropriation does
not necessarily involve the theft of one's entire self, or all of one's multiple
selves. Rather, it usually involves one particular self.
Indeed, appropriation seems harmful, in part, because it threatens to
unbalance the "basket" of one's identity by removing and rearranging its
contents. Some selves may carry more or less "weight" in maintaining one's
identity. Appropriation, then, may be viewed as causing a legally cognizable
201. Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70 (W.Va. 1984).
202. Id. at 75.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 90.
206. Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 86 (emphasis in original).
207. In an ethnographic account of Nigerian Songhay trading practices in Harlem, Rosemary
Coombe analyzed their merchandising of Malcolm X and the "X" symbol. Rosemary J. Coombe, The
Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches to Law and Society in Conditions of
Globalization," 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 791, 812-35 (1995). She noted how the ubiquitous "X"
had a very different cultural meaning for the Songhay traders than for many other American born
residents of Harlem. Id. The Songhay were trading on Malcolm X's image, yet they were imbuing it
with a different and distinctive identity. Id.
208. COHEN, supra note 29, at 72.
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harm when the particular self that is appropriated is perceived as somehow
particularly salient or necessary to the maintenance to one's "stable, core self,"
or one's overall identity as a unique individual.
In Crump's case, the court considered the possibility that the picture as
displayed appropriated only some generic fungible quality that did not
distinctively adhere to Crump but, rather, represented all women coal miners.
20 9
Hence, there might be no, or minimal, effacement of Crump's unique individual
identity. Yet the court recognized that that very same image, if used in a
different way, might give rise to appropriation if, for example, it were used
somehow to trade on the specificity of Crump's identity as invested in that
image.
210
Thus, the degree to which an individual's identity may be bound up with an
image may depend not only on her own subjective projection of herself into that
image but also upon the use made of it by the appropriator. The use of an
unidentifiable arm, or other nonspecific fragment of the body, might not give rise
to a claim. Similarly, this use of a "fragment" of the meaning of an image, which
alludes to the generic identity of "woman coal miner," might also be acceptable.
The court in Nebb found, in effect, that social recognition would condition
the degree to which the plaintiff's identity was actually invested in a particular
use of his or her name.211 Similarly, the court in Crump, while acknowledging
the plaintiff's full investment of herself in her image, found social recognition to
condition the degree to which her identity was commodified by a particular use
of her image.2t 2 Unlike Nebb, however, the photographer's use of identity in
Crump involves more than a mere coincidence of signifiers. Here the
photograph actually portrayed this specific Sue Crump.213 There was no other
person who happened to share the same physical attributes.
The argument that the photograph in Crump represented some "generic"
woman miner is not without merit. However, the court's unquestioning
acceptance of that argument effectively renders Crump's identity similarly
"generic"-that is, it effaces her distinctive individuality. Once again, the
readiness with which a court is willing to deprive a woman of control over the
maintenance of her identity is unsettling.
This readiness is grounded in the court's understanding that the "relevant"
audience or community of viewers would readily read the image as generic. The
result, however, may also be colored by the fact that the image appeared as part
of a news story and not an advertisement.214 Therefore, the viewing community
209. Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 86.
210. Id.
211. See Nebb v. Bell, 41 F. Supp. 929, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (implying that use of another's name,
which has unique significance, or trading upon reputation of another is actionable).
212. See Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 86 (concluding that using Crump's file photograph to portray
likeness of woman coal miner is incidental use of Crump's own likeness).
213. Id. at 75.
214. Id.
20011
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
did not construct Crump's image as a commodity.215 It merely constructed it as a
vehicle for the conveyance of information about a matter of public concern. 216
Crump's image thus embodied the distinctive identity of "woman coal miner," an
identity Crump herself claimed to share.2 17 That identity was not reduced to a
fungible commodity through association with a commercial product. 218
B. Doppelgangers
More problematic is the use of celebrity look-alikes. One might argue that
celebrities, in seeking the limelight, have no grounds to complain of the use of
their images, whether actual or simulated. Sheldon Halpern notes that courts
following the privacy-based notion of appropriation as a harm to identity have
tended to find a waiver of the right with respect to celebrities. 219 He also
observes, however, that courts have largely finessed the issue by developing the
property-based right of publicity to protect celebrities.220
Avishai Margalit observes that in mass society, invasions of privacy through
gossip affect mainly the rich and famous. 221 He argues, however, that such
people "have human dignity, and in a decent society they can and should be
allowed to protect their dignity. '222 The question, Margalit asserts, "is whether
gossip puts famous people in their place as basically ordinary people-insulting
them perhaps, but not humiliating them--or whether it actually makes them
seem nonhuman. Does gossip affect only the celebrities' public image, or does it
affect their self image as well?" 223  For "gossip" we might well read
"appropriation of identity. '224
Noncommercial uses of identity may be insulting, but do not tend to
humiliate or otherwise render the subject nonhuman. Nevertheless, as we see in
the cases discussed below, some celebrities do indeed find certain commercial
uses of their images to be humiliating.225 Such uses make the offended celebrity
seem "nonhuman" by rendering her identity a fungible commodity or by
fragmenting her identity by reducing it to one image or association without her
consent. Publicity rights may apply to cases that affect "only the celebrities'
public image," but privacy rights still apply where "self image" is implicated.
215. Id. at 86.
216. Id.
217. Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 86.
218. Id.
219. Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative
Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1206-07 (1986) (summarizing decisions concluding that
celebrity, particularly one who capitalized on notoriety, cannot claim unauthorized commercialization
of identity).
220. Id. at 1206-07.
221. AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 206-07 (1996).
222. Id. at 206.
223. Id. at 206-207.
224. See id. (implying that relationship exists between gossip and appropriation of identity).
225. See infra notes 226-274 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases involving
appropriation by celebrity look-alikes.
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One of the most notorious recent cases of appropriation via look-alike
involved an advertisement by designer Christian Dior which included both real
celebrities, such as movie reviewer Gene Shalit, together with a woman made up
to look like Jacqueline Onassis.226 Onassis sued seeking an injunction against
further dissemination of the advertisement. 27 The context of the image was
critical to the court's analysis. The court found that by using the look-alike in an
advertisement which also contained real celebrities, the defendant meant to
convey that the look-alike really was Onassis, or at the least meant to cause
confusion about the subject's identity.228 The court held for Onassis after
determining that the language "portrait or picture" as used in the New York
statute governing appropriation contemplated "a representation which conveys
the essence and likeness of an individual, not only [sic] actuality, but the close
and purposeful resemblance to reality."
229
"Essence" and "likeness" here become the critical elements of an
appropriated image.230  "Likeness" is a fairly straightforward concept. One
interesting observation is that one person's likeness can apparently be
represented by a different person who, in effect, becomes a canvas upon which
the image is rendered through a deliberate attempt to mimic the appearance of
the subject. Again, the Onassis court recognized that a likeness does not inhere
solely in the individual, but rather is constructed through social perception.
The mimicry, however, must contain more than mere physical resemblance;
it must also contain the "essence" of the subject.231 The court thus implies that
some core part of the subject's identity must be captured in the representation in
order to establish a claim of appropriation. 232 As the court put it, the statute "is
intended to protect the essence of the person, his or her identity or persona from
being unwillingly or unknowingly misappropriated for the profit of another."
233
What was stolen, then, was not Onassis's image per se, but the meaning or
substance of her identity that was, in effect, transferred onto the look-alike.
234
How did this transfer occur? Onassis herself did not pose for the picture in
the advertisement, nor did she claim that it was actually a true portrait of her.
235
How then could she be said to have invested her identity in the picture to such a
degree that its commercial use served to exploit her?
The court established the fact of appropriation by appeal to the public
perception of the image.236 Onassis's identity became implicated in the image
226. Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
227. Id. at 256.
228. Id. at 262.
229. Id. at 261.
230. Id.
231. Onassis, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
232. See id. at 261 (noting that there are many aspects of identity, yet legislature only accorded
protection to aspects embodied in name and face).
233. Id. at 260 (emphasis in original).
234. Id. at 262-63.
235. Id. at 256.
236. See supra note 228 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the juxtaposition of look-
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because a "reasonable person" or, more specifically, a person reasonably well-
versed in contemporary American culture, would naturally perceive it to be a
portrait of her.237 Public perception, as determined by the norms of the relevant
community of observers, here became the vehicle by which the law recognized
the investment of one's self in an image.
238
The image in question in Onassis did not come to embody the essence of
the individual's self until it was recognized by the community as a representation
of that individual. 239 That is, the community played a role in investing an image
with the essence of the individual.240 Nevertheless, to form the basis of an
actionable offense, the location of that essence in the image had to be
subjectively experienced and confirmed by the person represented. 241 Together,
the individual and the community thereby mutually created an image that could
be said legally to embody aspects of the individual's personal identity.242
To complicate matters still further, the court in Onassis also had to consider
the claims of the look-alike herself, who made a living by voluntarily marketing
her own image as a likeness of Onassis.243 That is, two separate and distinct
identities were implicated in the look-alike image: Onassis's identity and the
look-alike's identity. Paradoxically, it appears that the identity of the person
who actually posed for the picture was effaced by the court's decision.244
The court, however, did not enjoin the look-alike from making any use at all
of her resemblance to Onassis. 245  Rather, it found her impersonations
impermissible only when performed in a context calculated to deceive or confuse
the viewer as to her true identity.246 It seems, therefore, that manipulation of
public perception was the means by which Onassis's identity was appropriated.
The exact same image, presented in a different advertisement-without other
real celebrities, for example, or with a clear disclaimer-may not have given rise
to a cause of action.
The question of impersonation harkens back to the cases of Baumann and
Hodecker. In those cases, the courts found no "personation" of the plaintiff
wives by the women who had taken their married names.247 In marked contrast
alike and real-life figures could lead public to believe that the look-alike is actually Onassis.
237. See Onassis, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 262 (stating that providing look-alike with appropriate make-
up and hairdo transforms her into one of most recognizable women in world).
238. See id. (arguing that using one's own picture can be limited if contrived to convey
appearance of someone better known).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Onassis, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
243. Id. at 261-62.
244. See id. at 261 (stating that using own face in way to deceive or promote confusion can be
enjoined).
245. Id. at 263.
246. See supra note 238 and accompanying text for discussion of how a court may enjoin the use
of one's own picture if contrived to convey the appearance of someone better known.
247. See supra Part L.A for a discussion of these cases.
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to the finding in Onassis, the court in Hodecker found that:
[t]he possibility that others may be misled by the assumed relation of
the defendant to Hodecker does not concern the plaintiff, unless by
that means some of her property rights or interests may be brought in
question .... The question of the identity of the plaintiff as the wife of
Hodecker... is merely a social one.
248
The contrasts between Hodecker and Onassis are revealing. Obviously,
there were great changes in women's social, economic, and legal status between
1896 and 1984. More specifically, there is the tremendous difference in social
and economic standing between Anna Hodecker and Jacqueline Onassis. The
Hodecker court also displays the courts' classic late-nineteenth-century
reluctance to intrude the state into social affairs.
The intervening case of Berenice Baumann, decided on the eve of the New
Deal in 1929, still looks back to Hodecker, but its vigorous dissent looks forward
to Onassis. The court in Onassis, writing long after the reforms of the
Progressive Era and the New Deal transformed modern governance, readily
implicated the state in social questions by interpreting social relations through
the prism of the law. 249 Finally, the court in Onassis had a clear statute and years
of precedent to deal with, whereas the court in Hodecker was venturing into new
and relatively uncharted waters.
250
Beyond these conspicuous contrasts, however, lie several other interesting
differences. First, as a widow of great wealth and renown, Jacqueline Onassis
fully owned her identity. It is interesting to note, however, that Onassis, one of
the great female popular icons of Twentieth Century America, derived her status
largely through her identification with her two famous husbands. That is, even
though she was a powerful and financially independent woman, Onassis's
identity remained largely a function of her marital status-a gift, as it were, from
her now-deceased husbands.
Second, the look-alike impersonated Onassis in a manner that explicitly
commodified her identity. The defendant in Hodecker was not directly using her
identity for commercial purposes, except insofar as the status of a marriage may
be viewed as an economic relationship conferring material benefits.251 Third,
even though Onassis undeniably involved a celebrity whose persona might carry
great economic value, the court readily recognized the intangible dignitary harm
of the impersonation.252 Onassis herself did not seek monetary damages for
unjust enrichment, only the equitable remedy of an injunction-a remedy
calculated to protect her identity, not her pocket book.253 Fourth, the Onassis
court found a willful attempt to deceive the public as to the identity of the look-
248. Hodecker v. Stricker, 39 N.Y.S. 515, 517-18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1896).
249. See Onassis, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 258-62 (enjoining unauthorized use of look-alike's picture
pursuant to statute because look-alike picture is contrived to convey appearance of celebrity).
250. See Hodecker, 39 N.Y.S. at 515 (noting novelty of action).
251. Id. at 516.
252. Onassis, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
253. Id. at 256.
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alike,254 whereas the court in Hodecker found that the defendant did not "seek to
personate the plaintiff.
255
Finally, and most importantly, the court in Onassis legally recognized the
significance of community perception in investing a particular name or image
with a subject's identity.256 The Hodecker court, mired in the late-nineteenth-
century laissez-faire individualism of the Lochner era dismissed such a concern
as "merely a social one." 257 To the court, impersonation depended solely on the
intent of the defendant. 258 Onassis, and other recent cases that focus on the
recognizability of an image, represent the development, if only implicit, of the
courts' acknowledgment that identity is constructed and maintained through
interaction with community perception and practices and that the state, through
the courts, has a role in recognizing and managing that interaction.
The courts have also recognized that identity is not static but is constructed,
as well as reconstructed, over time. The case of Gabrielle Darley Melvin and her
outrage at the unauthorized resurrection of her past identity as Gabrielle Darley
is one case in point.2 59 More recently, in another case involving a celebrity look-
alike, a court more explicitly confronted the problem of the legal status of
multiple identities over time.
In 1985, one year after Onassis, Woody Allen, the well-known comedian,
actor, and movie director, brought suit under New York's privacy statute and the
Lanham Act to enjoin the dissemination of an advertisement for a video store
that showed a celebrity look-alike portraying Allen.26° The court ultimately
resolved the claim by finding that the advertisement violated the Lanham Act in
using a representation which might confuse or mislead consumers.
261
Nonetheless, it also considered at length Allen's privacy-based appropriation
claim and reflected upon its legal implications.
262
The court began with a discussion of whether the advertisement qualified as
a "recognizable likeness" of the plaintiff.263 It found the status of a look-alike to
be far more problematic in this regard than a mere photograph or artistic
representation. 264 The issue for the court was not whether the look-alike would
254. Id. at 262.
255. Hodecker, 39 N.Y.S. at 517.
256. Onassis, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
257. Hodecker, 39 N.Y.S. at 518.
258. Standing between Hodecker and Onassis, both chronologically and conceptually, the dissent
in the 1929 case of Baumann would have found appropriation based on the fact that the defendant had
"usurped the status, the relationship before the public, which belongs to the plaintiff." Baumann v.
Baumann, 165 N.E. 819, 822 (N.Y. 1929) (O'Brien, J., dissenting). See supra notes 76-92 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
259. See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91
(Cal. 1931).
260. Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
261. Id. at 632.
262. Id. at 620-25.
263. Id. at 623-24.
264. Id. at 624.
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"remind" people of Allen, but rather whether "most persons who could identify
an actual photograph of the plaintiff would be likely to think that this was
actually his picture." 265 Again, identification by objective observers located in
the subject's community became the basis for investing the image with aspects of
the subject's identity.
In this case, however, the look-alike portrayed an earlier "version" of Allen,
a past identity which was no longer consonant with his present self. As the court
put it, "the hair style and expression [of the look-alike], while characteristic of
the endearing 'schlemiel' embodied by plaintiff in his earlier comic works, are
out of step with plaintiff's post-'Annie Hall' appearance and the serious image
and somber mien that he has projected in recent years." 266 The court found this
relevant primarily as it bore on whether an observer would think the image
actually was Allen.267 If so, a claim of appropriation might be warranted. The
court found that the advertisement did make a reference to Allen, but it would
"hesitate.. .to conclude that the photograph is, as a matter of law, plaintiff's
portrait or picture."
268
Consider, first, that if the court were concerned only with the property-
based aspects of the celebrity image, then all representations of Allen, regardless
of the stage of his life portrayed, would presumably be his property. However,
because the court was concerned with the privacy-based dignitary aspects of
appropriation of identity it had to consider whether this particular image was
invested with aspects of Allen's current identity. That is, the court was
concerned with which of Allen's personae had been appropriated. If the
"schlemiel" persona of the past were sufficiently divorced in the public mind
from Allen's current, more serious persona, then there would be no
appropriation.
In the law of appropriation, therefore, identity is not fixed and bounded. It
shifts and evolves according to time and context. The use of the "schlemiel"
persona before Allen had appeared in "Annie Hall" might constitute an
appropriation, whereas the use of the exact same image some years later might
not. The court recognized that Allen's identity had developed over time. 269 He
was literally, and legally, not the same person he once was.270 To the extent that
he retained aspects of the identity embodied by the "schlemiel" image he might
be able to bring a claim of appropriation.
271
265. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 624. This standard may sound like that applied in cases of defamation
where the community must be able to recognize that the defamatory statement refers to the plaintiff.
In a case of defamation, however, such perception merely provides the basis for establishing material
harm resulting from damage to the plaintiffs standing in the community. In a case of appropriation,
community perception itself serves to invest the plaintiffs identity in the image. The plaintiff then
sustains a personal dignitary harm through the commodification of her identity in the image.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 624.
269. Id. at 617.
270. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 617.
271. Id.
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However, the court indicated that his newer identity was currently more
salient.272 It established this in large part through reference to the public's
perception and understanding of Allen as having left the "schlemiel" behind to
become a more serious filmmaker.273 Allen's present persona, therefore, would
not likely be harmed by the advertisement. The advertisement's image of a past
self might enslave a past identity, but the identity of Allen as constituted in the
current plaintiff before the court was not captured by the look-alike; hence, the
court was hesitant to find an appropriation.
274
III. THE SINCEREST FORM OF FLATTERY: APPROPRIATION OF "AURAL IMAGE"
Courts have moved beyond mere physical representations of an individual
in addressing the notion of self. Courts have further gone beyond the visual to
find the unauthorized use of certain aural "images" sufficient to support a claim
for appropriation. For example, Bette Midler, a popular singer and actress with
a highly distinctive vocal style, brought a successful claim against a corporation
for using a "sound-alike" in commercial television advertisements.
2 75
In the 1980s, Bette Midler had been approached by an advertising agency to
perform a song to run with a television commercial for Ford Motor Company. 276
Midler refused, saying she did not do commercials. 277 The agency thereupon
hired one of Midler's former back-up singers, whom it told to sound as much like
Midler as possible. 278 After the commercial ran, a number of people did indeed
believe the voice to be Midler's. 279  Midler subsequently brought suit in
California, seeking an injunction and damages.
280
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that California statutory law
provided no relief because its reach was limited to recovery for the use of the
plaintiff's actual voice.281 Similarly, because Midler did not do commercials,
there was no cause of action under the federal Lanham Act as there was no
unfair competition or impairment of Midler's professional opportunities. 282
Neither was there an action for copyright infringement because "a voice is not
copyrightable. The sounds are not 'fixed'. What is put forward as protectible
272. Id. at 618.
273. Id. at 624.
274. Allen might have based his claim on grounds similar to Melvin's, namely that the
advertisement forced a previous identity upon him. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. 1931). Allen,
however, was not offended by the resurrection of his "schlemiel" persona so much as by the
commercialization of any image of himself. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 624. There was no question here of
his present identity being subordinated to a past identity, as with Melvin. Id. The subordination, if
any, came from the commodification of his identity. Id.
275. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
276. Id. at 461.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 461-62.
280. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
281. Id. at 463.
282. Id. at 461.
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here is far more personal than any work of authorship.
'283
Following up on the idea of Midler's personal investment in her voice, the
court did, however, find that Midler stated a valid cause of action based on the
common law tort of appropriation. 284  Drawing a direct analogy to the
appropriation of an individual's visual image, the court argued that "[a] voice is
as distinctive and personal as a face .... The singer manifests herself in the song.
To impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity. '285 Like the court in
McFarland, the Midler court focused on the way and degree to which an
individual becomes bound up with a representation of herself.286 Midler was
harmed by the sound-alike to the degree that she had "manifested" herself in the
song.
287
The Midler court here takes a step beyond traditional appropriation law in
recognizing that one's identity may become bound up with something other than
one's name or visual image. In basing the cause of action on this relationship,
the court used the law to recognize and construct a conception of identity as both
worthy of legal protection and capable of being projected. The protection
extended beyond the boundary of the corporeal body or its visual representation
into such intangible and "unfixed" a thing as the sound of one's voice.288 As the
court in Allen recognized that identity may shift over time, the court in Midler
established that a particular manifestation of identity may be as evanescent and
unbounded as the sound of one's voice.
289
Yet, cognizant of the tensions raised in some of the look-alike cases, the
court limited the scope of its holding:
We need not and do not go so far as to hold that every imitation of a
voice to advertise merchandise is actionable. We hold only that when a
distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is
deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have
appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort in
California.
290
As in Allen and Onassis, appropriation depended in part on public
perception and on the intent of the defendant. The legal relation between self
and image-or, as here, voice-was not constituted solely by the individual
subject but, rather, was produced in conjunction with the public and the
defendant. That is, Midler's legal interest in her identity as manifested in her
voice was contingent not only upon her own production of a "distinctive voice"
which captured an aspect of her persona, but also upon public recognition of her
voice and upon the defendant's intent to appropriate and commodify her voice.
283. Id. at 462.
284. Id. at 463.
285. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
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At law, Midler's identity was a social production and its status depended upon
the court's interpretation of such distinctive cultural practices as the public
recognition of celebrity.
291
CONCLUSION
If we take the jurisprudence of appropriation seriously, then we must
reconceive the nature and status of identity within existing legal doctrine. My
review of the case law of appropriation reveals a long-established but largely
overlooked tradition in American jurisprudence that elaborates a relatively
nuanced and complex understanding of law's identity. For nearly one hundred
years, courts have been effectively managing complex and fluid categories of
identity. The cases exhibit a practical appreciation of the fact that in the context
of appropriation, identity is not necessarily a fixed and bounded thing with some
essential, unchanging core. Rather, we have seen courts recognize that identity
may change over time, that single markers of identity may be shared by multiple
subjects who nonetheless remain distinct, and that a single subject may claim
multiple identities, each of which implicates important aspects of her self.
Under the jurisprudence of appropriation law identity is recognized,
constructed and maintained through social processes that involve negotiations
between community and individual. The process of negotiation, however, is not
inherently democratic. As we saw in several cases, the social construction of
identity may reflect and reinforce existing social hierarchies.
This is not inevitable. The particular realization of law's identity in these
cases may be highly problematic, but the courts' general engagement with the
status of identity reveals that the American legal system is capable of managing
identity in a substantive manner beyond mere comparative standards. Thus,
through these cases we may elicit from existing legal traditions a more explicit
articulation of how the legal system negotiates identity. In so doing, I hope I
have made some room for a more informed discussion of what works for whom,
and why.
291. In a case similar to Midler's, the singer Tom Waits sued Frito-Lay for appropriation based
on a radio commercial that used a singer who imitated Waits's distinctive voice. Waits v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992). Following the decision in Midler, the court held that a voice, when
distinctive and "a sufficient indicia of a celebrity's identity," was protected by the law against
appropriation. Id. at 1098. Also, as in Midler, the court required that the plaintiff be "widely known"
to succeed. Id. at 1102. It noted as well that the defendant deliberately sought to find a singer who
could render a "near perfect" imitation of Waits's voice. Id. at 1097. That is, public perception and
the intent of the defendant again played a role in the court's recognition of Waits's legal interest in his
identity. Id. at 1097, 1112.
In an update on the cases, J. Thomas McCarthy reported that, upon remand, a Los Angeles
jury returned a verdict of $400,000 for Midler in 1989. In 1992, a Los Angeles federal jury awarded
Waits $2,500,000. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed both awards. J. Thomas McCarthy,
The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
129, 130 (1995).
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